[252] Otho's
Praetorian
Guards were the weakest point in his army.
Tacitus
There is no clear evidence of this, but under
Diocletian Corsica was certainly separate.
[247] These cruisers were of a peculiarly light build, called
after the Liburni, an Illyrian tribe, who fought for Octavian
in the battle of Actium. He introduced similar craft into the
Roman navy. They were very fast, and worked with a triangular,
instead of the usual square sail.
[248] i. e. his Corsican and Roman clients.
[249] i. 70.
[250] Piacenza and Pavia.
[251] i. e. one of the two detachments sent forward by the
armies of Dalmatia and Pannonia (cp. chap. 11).
[252] Otho's Praetorian Guards were the weakest point in his army.
[253] Cp. i. 36 note 61.
[254] i. e. that Spurinna was in league with Caecina, and meant
to hand them over to him.
[255] He was making 'a reconnaissance in force westwards along
the river bank to discover, if he could, the strength and
intentions of the enemy' (B. W. Henderson, _Civil War_, &c. ).
But Mr. E. G. Hardy points out that, as he had only 4,000 men
and Caecina's 30,000 were in the immediate neighbourhood, this
would have been foolish. It seems better to believe Tacitus'
suggestion that his insubordinate troops forced Spurinna to
march out.
Diocletian Corsica was certainly separate.
[247] These cruisers were of a peculiarly light build, called
after the Liburni, an Illyrian tribe, who fought for Octavian
in the battle of Actium. He introduced similar craft into the
Roman navy. They were very fast, and worked with a triangular,
instead of the usual square sail.
[248] i. e. his Corsican and Roman clients.
[249] i. 70.
[250] Piacenza and Pavia.
[251] i. e. one of the two detachments sent forward by the
armies of Dalmatia and Pannonia (cp. chap. 11).
[252] Otho's Praetorian Guards were the weakest point in his army.
[253] Cp. i. 36 note 61.
[254] i. e. that Spurinna was in league with Caecina, and meant
to hand them over to him.
[255] He was making 'a reconnaissance in force westwards along
the river bank to discover, if he could, the strength and
intentions of the enemy' (B. W. Henderson, _Civil War_, &c. ).
But Mr. E. G. Hardy points out that, as he had only 4,000 men
and Caecina's 30,000 were in the immediate neighbourhood, this
would have been foolish. It seems better to believe Tacitus'
suggestion that his insubordinate troops forced Spurinna to
march out.