Poets and patriots, however, restored the ancient faith
and taught power's due use by showing the necessity of harmony in the
state.
and taught power's due use by showing the necessity of harmony in the
state.
Alexander Pope
Finally it urges calm submission and
acquiescence in what is hard to understand, since "one truth is
clear,--whatever is, is right. "
The second epistle deals with the nature of man as an individual. It
begins by urging men to abandon vain questionings of God's providence
and to take up the consideration of their own natures, for "the proper
study of mankind is man. " Pope points out that the two cardinal
principles of man's nature are self-love and reason, the first an
impelling, the second a regulating power. The aim of both these
principles is pleasure, by which Pope means happiness, which he takes
for the highest good. Each man is dominated by a master passion, and it
is the proper function of reason to control this passion for good and to
make it bear fruit in virtue. No man is wholly virtuous or vicious, and
Heaven uses the mingled qualities of men to bind them together in mutual
interdependence, and makes the various passions and imperfections of
mankind serve the general good. And the final conclusion is that "though
man's a fool, yet God is wise. "
The third epistle treats of the nature of man with respect to society.
All creatures, Pope asserts, are bound together and live not for
themselves alone, but man is preeminently a social being. The first
state of man was the state of nature when he lived in innocent ignorance
with his fellow-creatures. Obeying the voice of nature, man learned to
copy and improve upon the instincts of the animals, to build, to plow,
to spin, to unite in societies like those of ants and bees. The first
form of government was patriarchal; then monarchies arose in which
virtue, "in arms or arts," made one man ruler over many. In either case
the origin of true government as of true religion was love. Gradually
force crept in and uniting with superstition gave rise to tyranny and
false religions.
Poets and patriots, however, restored the ancient faith
and taught power's due use by showing the necessity of harmony in the
state. Pope concludes by asserting the folly of contention for forms of
government or modes of faith. The common end of government as of
religion is the general good. It may be noticed in passing that Pope's
account of the evolution of society bears even less relation to
historical facts than does his account of the development of literature
in the 'Essay on Criticism. '
The last epistle discusses the nature of happiness, "our being's end and
aim. " Happiness is attainable by all men who think right and mean well.
It consists not in individual, but in mutual pleasure. It does not
consist in external things, mere gifts of fortune, but in health, peace,
and competence. Virtuous men are, indeed, subject to calamities of
nature; but God cannot be expected to suspend the operation of general
laws to spare the virtuous. Objectors who would construct a system in
which all virtuous men are blest, are challenged to define the virtuous
and to specify what is meant by blessings. Honors, nobility, fame,
superior talents, often merely serve to make their possessors unhappy.
Virtue alone is happiness, and virtue consists in a recognition of the
laws of Providence, and in love for one's fellow-man.
Even this brief outline will show, I think, some of the inconsistencies
and omissions of Pope's train of thought. A careful examination of his
arguments in detail would be wholly out of place here. The reader who
wishes to pursue the subject further may consult Warburton's elaborate
vindication of Pope's argument, and Elwin's equally prosy refutation, or
better still the admirable summary by Leslie Stephen in the chapter on
this poem in his life of Pope ('English Men of Letters'). No one is now
likely to turn to the writer of the early eighteenth century for a
system of the universe, least of all to a writer so incapable of exact
or systematic thinking as Alexander Pope.
acquiescence in what is hard to understand, since "one truth is
clear,--whatever is, is right. "
The second epistle deals with the nature of man as an individual. It
begins by urging men to abandon vain questionings of God's providence
and to take up the consideration of their own natures, for "the proper
study of mankind is man. " Pope points out that the two cardinal
principles of man's nature are self-love and reason, the first an
impelling, the second a regulating power. The aim of both these
principles is pleasure, by which Pope means happiness, which he takes
for the highest good. Each man is dominated by a master passion, and it
is the proper function of reason to control this passion for good and to
make it bear fruit in virtue. No man is wholly virtuous or vicious, and
Heaven uses the mingled qualities of men to bind them together in mutual
interdependence, and makes the various passions and imperfections of
mankind serve the general good. And the final conclusion is that "though
man's a fool, yet God is wise. "
The third epistle treats of the nature of man with respect to society.
All creatures, Pope asserts, are bound together and live not for
themselves alone, but man is preeminently a social being. The first
state of man was the state of nature when he lived in innocent ignorance
with his fellow-creatures. Obeying the voice of nature, man learned to
copy and improve upon the instincts of the animals, to build, to plow,
to spin, to unite in societies like those of ants and bees. The first
form of government was patriarchal; then monarchies arose in which
virtue, "in arms or arts," made one man ruler over many. In either case
the origin of true government as of true religion was love. Gradually
force crept in and uniting with superstition gave rise to tyranny and
false religions.
Poets and patriots, however, restored the ancient faith
and taught power's due use by showing the necessity of harmony in the
state. Pope concludes by asserting the folly of contention for forms of
government or modes of faith. The common end of government as of
religion is the general good. It may be noticed in passing that Pope's
account of the evolution of society bears even less relation to
historical facts than does his account of the development of literature
in the 'Essay on Criticism. '
The last epistle discusses the nature of happiness, "our being's end and
aim. " Happiness is attainable by all men who think right and mean well.
It consists not in individual, but in mutual pleasure. It does not
consist in external things, mere gifts of fortune, but in health, peace,
and competence. Virtuous men are, indeed, subject to calamities of
nature; but God cannot be expected to suspend the operation of general
laws to spare the virtuous. Objectors who would construct a system in
which all virtuous men are blest, are challenged to define the virtuous
and to specify what is meant by blessings. Honors, nobility, fame,
superior talents, often merely serve to make their possessors unhappy.
Virtue alone is happiness, and virtue consists in a recognition of the
laws of Providence, and in love for one's fellow-man.
Even this brief outline will show, I think, some of the inconsistencies
and omissions of Pope's train of thought. A careful examination of his
arguments in detail would be wholly out of place here. The reader who
wishes to pursue the subject further may consult Warburton's elaborate
vindication of Pope's argument, and Elwin's equally prosy refutation, or
better still the admirable summary by Leslie Stephen in the chapter on
this poem in his life of Pope ('English Men of Letters'). No one is now
likely to turn to the writer of the early eighteenth century for a
system of the universe, least of all to a writer so incapable of exact
or systematic thinking as Alexander Pope.
