Thus the provinces rang from end to end with the
preparations
for 84
ships, soldiers and arms.
ships, soldiers and arms.
Tacitus
[409]
Still more were raised to senatorial rank. They were mostly men of
distinction who soon rose high, and with others success atoned for any
lack of merit. A donation for the troops had been mentioned by
Mucianus in his first speech, but in very guarded terms. Even
Vespasian offered for the civil war a lower figure than others gave in
time of peace, for he had set his face with admirable firmness against
largess to the soldiers, and his army was none the worse for it.
Envoys were dispatched to Parthia and Armenia to secure that the
legions, while engaged in the civil war, should not be exposed to
attack in the rear. [410] It was arranged that Titus should carry on
the war in Judaea, while Vespasian held the keys of Egypt. [411]
Against Vitellius it seemed sufficient to send a part of their forces
under the command of Mucianus. He would have Vespasian's name behind
him and the irresistible force of destiny. Letters were written to
all the armies and their generals with instructions that they should
try to win over those of the Guards who were hostile to Vitellius by
promising them renewal of service.
Meanwhile, Mucianus, who acted the part more of a partner than a 83
subordinate, moved forward without the encumbrance of baggage, neither
marching so slowly as to look like holding back, nor so rapidly as not
to allow time for rumours to spread. He realized that his force was
small, and that the less people saw the more they would believe of it.
However, he had a solid column following in support, composed of the
Sixth legion and some picked detachments numbering 13,000 men. [412] He
had ordered the fleet to move from Pontus to Byzantium, for he was
half-minded to leave Moesia and with his whole force to hold
Dyrrachium, at the same time using his fleet to dominate the Italian
sea. He would thus secure Greece and Asia in his rear, which would
otherwise be at the mercy of Vitellius, unless furnished with troops.
Vitellius also would himself be in doubt what points of the Italian
coast to defend, if Mucianus with his ships threatened both Brundisium
and Tarentum and the whole coastline of Calabria and Lucania.
Thus the provinces rang from end to end with the preparations for 84
ships, soldiers and arms. But the heaviest burden was the raising of
money. 'Funds,' said Mucianus, 'are the sinews of war,'[413] and in
his investigations he cared for neither justice nor equity, but solely
for the amount of the sum. Informers abounded, and pounced on every
rich man as their prey. This intolerable oppression, excused by the
necessities of war, was allowed to continue even in peace. It was not
so much that Vespasian at the beginning of his reign had made up his
mind to maintain unjust decisions, but fortune spoilt him; he had
learnt in a bad school and made a bold use of his lessons. Mucianus
also contributed from his private means, of which he was generous, as
he hoped to get a high rate of interest out of the country. Others
followed his example, but very few had his opportunity of recovering
their money.
In the meantime Vespasian's progress was accelerated by the 85
enthusiasm with which the Illyrian army[414] espoused his cause. The
Third set the example to the other legions of Moesia, the Eighth and
the Seventh Claudian, both strongly attached to Otho, although they
had not been present at the battle. On their arrival at Aquileia[415]
they had mobbed the couriers who brought the news of Otho's fall, and
torn to pieces the standards bearing Vitellius' name, finally looting
the camp-chest and dividing the money among themselves. These were
hostile acts. Alarmed at what they had done they began to reflect
that, while their conduct needed excuse before Vitellius, they could
make a merit of it with Vespasian. Accordingly, the three Moesian
legions addressed letters to the Pannonian army,[416] inviting their
co-operation, and meanwhile prepared to meet refusal with force.
Aponius Saturninus, the Governor of Moesia, took this opportunity to
attempt an abominable crime. He sent a centurion to murder Tettius
Julianus,[417] who commanded the Seventh legion, alleging the
interests of his party as a cloak for a personal quarrel.
Still more were raised to senatorial rank. They were mostly men of
distinction who soon rose high, and with others success atoned for any
lack of merit. A donation for the troops had been mentioned by
Mucianus in his first speech, but in very guarded terms. Even
Vespasian offered for the civil war a lower figure than others gave in
time of peace, for he had set his face with admirable firmness against
largess to the soldiers, and his army was none the worse for it.
Envoys were dispatched to Parthia and Armenia to secure that the
legions, while engaged in the civil war, should not be exposed to
attack in the rear. [410] It was arranged that Titus should carry on
the war in Judaea, while Vespasian held the keys of Egypt. [411]
Against Vitellius it seemed sufficient to send a part of their forces
under the command of Mucianus. He would have Vespasian's name behind
him and the irresistible force of destiny. Letters were written to
all the armies and their generals with instructions that they should
try to win over those of the Guards who were hostile to Vitellius by
promising them renewal of service.
Meanwhile, Mucianus, who acted the part more of a partner than a 83
subordinate, moved forward without the encumbrance of baggage, neither
marching so slowly as to look like holding back, nor so rapidly as not
to allow time for rumours to spread. He realized that his force was
small, and that the less people saw the more they would believe of it.
However, he had a solid column following in support, composed of the
Sixth legion and some picked detachments numbering 13,000 men. [412] He
had ordered the fleet to move from Pontus to Byzantium, for he was
half-minded to leave Moesia and with his whole force to hold
Dyrrachium, at the same time using his fleet to dominate the Italian
sea. He would thus secure Greece and Asia in his rear, which would
otherwise be at the mercy of Vitellius, unless furnished with troops.
Vitellius also would himself be in doubt what points of the Italian
coast to defend, if Mucianus with his ships threatened both Brundisium
and Tarentum and the whole coastline of Calabria and Lucania.
Thus the provinces rang from end to end with the preparations for 84
ships, soldiers and arms. But the heaviest burden was the raising of
money. 'Funds,' said Mucianus, 'are the sinews of war,'[413] and in
his investigations he cared for neither justice nor equity, but solely
for the amount of the sum. Informers abounded, and pounced on every
rich man as their prey. This intolerable oppression, excused by the
necessities of war, was allowed to continue even in peace. It was not
so much that Vespasian at the beginning of his reign had made up his
mind to maintain unjust decisions, but fortune spoilt him; he had
learnt in a bad school and made a bold use of his lessons. Mucianus
also contributed from his private means, of which he was generous, as
he hoped to get a high rate of interest out of the country. Others
followed his example, but very few had his opportunity of recovering
their money.
In the meantime Vespasian's progress was accelerated by the 85
enthusiasm with which the Illyrian army[414] espoused his cause. The
Third set the example to the other legions of Moesia, the Eighth and
the Seventh Claudian, both strongly attached to Otho, although they
had not been present at the battle. On their arrival at Aquileia[415]
they had mobbed the couriers who brought the news of Otho's fall, and
torn to pieces the standards bearing Vitellius' name, finally looting
the camp-chest and dividing the money among themselves. These were
hostile acts. Alarmed at what they had done they began to reflect
that, while their conduct needed excuse before Vitellius, they could
make a merit of it with Vespasian. Accordingly, the three Moesian
legions addressed letters to the Pannonian army,[416] inviting their
co-operation, and meanwhile prepared to meet refusal with force.
Aponius Saturninus, the Governor of Moesia, took this opportunity to
attempt an abominable crime. He sent a centurion to murder Tettius
Julianus,[417] who commanded the Seventh legion, alleging the
interests of his party as a cloak for a personal quarrel.
