No More Learning

Before they came to close quarters, the Vitellians began to 25
retire. Celsus, forewarned of the ruse, halted his men. Whereupon the
Vitellians impatiently rose from their ambush and, while Celsus slowly
retired, followed him further and further until they plunged headlong
into an ambush themselves. The auxiliaries were on their flanks; the
legions faced them in front; and the cavalry by a sudden manoeuvre had
closed in on their rear. However, Suetonius Paulinus did not
immediately give the signal for his infantry to charge. He was by
nature dilatory, and preferred cautiously reasoned measures to
accidental success. He kept on issuing orders about filling up the
ditches, clearing the fields and extending the line, convinced that it
was soon enough to play for victory when he had taken every precaution
against defeat. This delay gave the Vitellians time to take refuge in
the vineyards, where the interlaced vine-stems made it hard to follow.
Adjoining these was a little wood, from under cover of which they
ventured another sally and killed the foremost of the Guards' cavalry.
There Prince Epiphanes[271] was wounded, while making vigorous efforts
to rally Otho's forces.

At this point Otho's infantry charged, crushed the opposing line, 26
and even routed the troops who were hurrying up in support. For
Caecina had brought up his reinforcements not all at once but in
separate detachments. These, arriving in scattered units, and never in
sufficient force, only added to the confusion, since the panic of the
rout infected them as well. Mutiny, too, broke out in the camp,
because the troops were not all taken into battle. Julius Gratus, the
camp-prefect, was put in irons on a charge of plotting with his
brother, who was fighting on Otho's side.
It was known that the
Othonians had arrested the brother, Julius Fronto, on the same charge.
For the rest, such was the universal panic among pursuers and pursued,
on the field and in the camp, that it was commonly said on both sides
that, if Suetonius Paulinus had not sounded the retreat, Caecina's
whole army might have been destroyed. Paulinus maintained that he
avoided any excessive strain of work or marching, for fear of exposing
his exhausted troops to a counter-attack from the Vitellians in the
camp, who were still fresh for battle: besides, he had no reserves to
fall back on in case of defeat. A few approved of the general's
strategy, but the common opinion was adverse. [272]

FOOTNOTES:

[226] See note 3.

[227] The legion brought from Spain, mentioned in i. 6.

[228] The revolt of Boadicea crushed by Suetonius Paulinus;
described by Tacitus in his life of Agricola and in Book XIV
of the _Annals_.

[229] i. e. for his projected war against the Albanians (cp. i.
6). Probably they stopped in Dalmatia on hearing of Nero's
fall.

[230] The quondam marines (cp. i.