It has often been believed that it was Flavius
Sabinus[454] who, using Rubrius Gallus as his agent, tampered with
Caecina's loyalty by promising that, if he came over, Vespasian would
ratify any conditions.
Sabinus[454] who, using Rubrius Gallus as his agent, tampered with
Caecina's loyalty by promising that, if he came over, Vespasian would
ratify any conditions.
Tacitus
After a while he began to waver.
In
his official letters and edicts he still acknowledged Vitellius, while
in secret communication with Vespasian and ready to support whichever
party proved successful. In Raetia and the Gallic provinces some
centurions and men carrying letters and edicts from Vespasian were
taken prisoners and sent to Vitellius, who had them executed. But most
of these envoys escaped capture either by their own ingenuity or the
loyal help of friends. Thus, while Vitellius' plans were known,
Vespasian's were for the most part still a secret. This was partly due
to Vitellius' negligence, but also to the fact that the garrisons on
the Pannonian Alps stopped all messengers. By sea, too, the
Etesian[453] winds from the north-west favoured ships sailing
eastward, but hindered the voyage from the East.
Terrified at last by the imminence of invasion and the alarming 99
news that reached him from all quarters, Vitellius instructed Caecina
and Valens to prepare for war. Caecina was sent on ahead, Valens, who
was just recovering from a serious illness, being delayed by his weak
state of health. Great, indeed, was the change in the appearance of
the German army as it marched out of Rome. There was neither energy in
their muscles nor fire in their hearts. Slowly the column straggled
on, their horses spiritless, their arms neglected. The men grumbled at
the sun, the dust, the weather, and were as ready to quarrel as they
were unwilling to work. To these disadvantages were added Caecina's
inveterate self-seeking and his newly-acquired indolence. An overdose
of success had made him slack and self-indulgent, or, if he was
plotting treachery, this may have been one of his devices for
demoralizing the army.
It has often been believed that it was Flavius
Sabinus[454] who, using Rubrius Gallus as his agent, tampered with
Caecina's loyalty by promising that, if he came over, Vespasian would
ratify any conditions. It may have occurred also to Caecina to
remember his quarrels and rivalry with Valens, and to consider that,
as he did not stand first with Vitellius, he had better acquire credit
and influence with the new emperor.
After taking an affectionate and respectful farewell of Vitellius, 100
Caecina dispatched a body of cavalry to occupy Cremona. He soon
followed with the detachments of the First, Fourth, Fifteenth, and
Sixteenth legions in the van. The centre was composed of the Fifth and
Twenty-second, and in the rear of the column came the Twenty-first
Rapax and the First Italian legion, with detachments from the three
legions of Britain and a select force of auxiliaries. When Caecina had
started, Valens wrote instructions to the legions belonging to his old
command[455] to await him on the march, saying that he and Caecina had
arranged this. Caecina, however, took advantage of being on the spot,
and pretended that this plan had been altered so as to enable them to
meet the first outbreak of the war with their full strength. So some
legions were hurried forward to Cremona[456] and part of the force was
directed upon Hostilia. [457] Caecina himself turned aside to Ravenna
on the pretext of giving instructions to the fleet. Thence he
proceeded to Patavium[458] to secure secrecy for his treacherous
designs. For Lucilius Bassus, whom Vitellius, from a prefect of
auxiliary cavalry had raised to the supreme command of the two fleets
at Ravenna and Misenum, felt aggrieved at not being immediately given
the praefecture of the Guards, and sought in dastardly treachery the
remedy for his unjustifiable annoyance. It can never be known whether
he influenced Caecina or whether one was as dishonest as the other.
There is seldom much to choose between rascals. The historians[459] 101
who compiled the records of this war in the days of the Flavian
dynasty were led by flattery into adducing as the causes of the
rebellion patriotism and the interests of peace. We cannot think them
right. Apart from the innate disloyalty of the rebels and the loss
of character after Galba's betrayal, they seem to have been led by
jealousy and rivalry into sacrificing Vitellius himself for fear that
they might lose the first place in his favour.
his official letters and edicts he still acknowledged Vitellius, while
in secret communication with Vespasian and ready to support whichever
party proved successful. In Raetia and the Gallic provinces some
centurions and men carrying letters and edicts from Vespasian were
taken prisoners and sent to Vitellius, who had them executed. But most
of these envoys escaped capture either by their own ingenuity or the
loyal help of friends. Thus, while Vitellius' plans were known,
Vespasian's were for the most part still a secret. This was partly due
to Vitellius' negligence, but also to the fact that the garrisons on
the Pannonian Alps stopped all messengers. By sea, too, the
Etesian[453] winds from the north-west favoured ships sailing
eastward, but hindered the voyage from the East.
Terrified at last by the imminence of invasion and the alarming 99
news that reached him from all quarters, Vitellius instructed Caecina
and Valens to prepare for war. Caecina was sent on ahead, Valens, who
was just recovering from a serious illness, being delayed by his weak
state of health. Great, indeed, was the change in the appearance of
the German army as it marched out of Rome. There was neither energy in
their muscles nor fire in their hearts. Slowly the column straggled
on, their horses spiritless, their arms neglected. The men grumbled at
the sun, the dust, the weather, and were as ready to quarrel as they
were unwilling to work. To these disadvantages were added Caecina's
inveterate self-seeking and his newly-acquired indolence. An overdose
of success had made him slack and self-indulgent, or, if he was
plotting treachery, this may have been one of his devices for
demoralizing the army.
It has often been believed that it was Flavius
Sabinus[454] who, using Rubrius Gallus as his agent, tampered with
Caecina's loyalty by promising that, if he came over, Vespasian would
ratify any conditions. It may have occurred also to Caecina to
remember his quarrels and rivalry with Valens, and to consider that,
as he did not stand first with Vitellius, he had better acquire credit
and influence with the new emperor.
After taking an affectionate and respectful farewell of Vitellius, 100
Caecina dispatched a body of cavalry to occupy Cremona. He soon
followed with the detachments of the First, Fourth, Fifteenth, and
Sixteenth legions in the van. The centre was composed of the Fifth and
Twenty-second, and in the rear of the column came the Twenty-first
Rapax and the First Italian legion, with detachments from the three
legions of Britain and a select force of auxiliaries. When Caecina had
started, Valens wrote instructions to the legions belonging to his old
command[455] to await him on the march, saying that he and Caecina had
arranged this. Caecina, however, took advantage of being on the spot,
and pretended that this plan had been altered so as to enable them to
meet the first outbreak of the war with their full strength. So some
legions were hurried forward to Cremona[456] and part of the force was
directed upon Hostilia. [457] Caecina himself turned aside to Ravenna
on the pretext of giving instructions to the fleet. Thence he
proceeded to Patavium[458] to secure secrecy for his treacherous
designs. For Lucilius Bassus, whom Vitellius, from a prefect of
auxiliary cavalry had raised to the supreme command of the two fleets
at Ravenna and Misenum, felt aggrieved at not being immediately given
the praefecture of the Guards, and sought in dastardly treachery the
remedy for his unjustifiable annoyance. It can never be known whether
he influenced Caecina or whether one was as dishonest as the other.
There is seldom much to choose between rascals. The historians[459] 101
who compiled the records of this war in the days of the Flavian
dynasty were led by flattery into adducing as the causes of the
rebellion patriotism and the interests of peace. We cannot think them
right. Apart from the innate disloyalty of the rebels and the loss
of character after Galba's betrayal, they seem to have been led by
jealousy and rivalry into sacrificing Vitellius himself for fear that
they might lose the first place in his favour.
