No More Learning

And
this induced Plato to esteem of Homer as a sacrilegious person, because
he presented the gods sometimes laughing. As also it is divinely said of
Aristotle, that to seen ridiculous is a part of dishonesty, and foolish.

_The wit of the old comedy_. --So that what either in the words or sense of
an author, or in the language or actions of men, is awry or depraved does
strangely stir mean affections, and provoke for the most part to
laughter. And therefore it was clear that all insolent and obscene
speeches, jests upon the best men, injuries to particular persons,
perverse and sinister sayings (and the rather unexpected) in the old
comedy did move laughter, especially where it did imitate any dishonesty,
and scurrility came forth in the place of wit, which, who understands the
nature and genius of laughter cannot but perfectly know.

_Aristophanes_. --_Plautus_. --Of which Aristophanes affords an ample
harvest, having not only outgone Plautus or any other in that kind, but
expressed all the moods and figures of what is ridiculous oddly. In
short, as vinegar is not accounted good until the wine be corrupted, so
jests that are true and natural seldom raise laughter with the beast the
multitude. They love nothing that is right and proper. The farther it
runs from reason or possibility with them the better it is.

_Socrates_. --_Theatrical wit_. --What could have made them laugh, like to
see Socrates presented, that example of all good life, honesty, and
virtue, to have him hoisted up with a pulley, and there play the
philosopher in a basket; measure how many foot a flea could skip
geometrically, by a just scale, and edify the people from the engine.
This was theatrical wit, right stage jesting, and relishing a playhouse,
invented for scorn and laughter; whereas, if it had savoured of equity,
truth, perspicuity, and candour, to have tasten a wise or a learned
palate,--spit it out presently!
this is bitter and profitable: this
instructs and would inform us: what need we know any thing, that are
nobly born, more than a horse-race, or a hunting-match, our day to break
with citizens, and such innate mysteries?

_The cart_. --This is truly leaping from the stage to the tumbril again,
reducing all wit to the original dung-cart.



Of the magnitude and compass of any fable, epic or dramatic.


_What the measure of a fable is_. --_The fable or plot of a poem
defined_. --_The epic fable_, _differing from the dramatic_. --To the
resolving of this question we must first agree in the definition of the
fable. The fable is called the imitation of one entire and perfect
action, whose parts are so joined and knit together, as nothing in the
structure can be changed, or taken away, without impairing or troubling
the whole, of which there is a proportionable magnitude in the members.
As for example: if a man would build a house, he would first appoint a
place to build it in, which he would define within certain bounds; so in
the constitution of a poem, the action is aimed at by the poet, which
answers place in a building, and that action hath his largeness, compass,
and proportion. But as a court or king's palace requires other
dimensions than a private house, so the epic asks a magnitude from other
poems, since what is place in the one is action in the other; the
difference is an space. So that by this definition we conclude the fable
to be the imitation of one perfect and entire action, as one perfect and
entire place is required to a building. By perfect, we understand that
to which nothing is wanting, as place to the building that is raised, and
action to the fable that is formed. It is perfect, perhaps not for a
court or king's palace, which requires a greater ground, but for the
structure he would raise; so the space of the action may not prove large
enough for the epic fable, yet be perfect for the dramatic, and whole.

_What we understand by whole_. --Whole we call that, and perfect, which
hath a beginning, a midst, and an end.