Boats were placed at equal intervals with their heads up stream and
fastened together by strong wooden planks.
fastened together by strong wooden planks.
Tacitus
Otho inclined
to a decisive engagement. His brother Titianus and Proculus, the
prefect of the Guard, with all the impatience of inexperience, stoutly
maintained that fortune and Providence, and Otho's own good genius
inspired his policy, and would inspire its performance. They had
descended to flattery by way of checking opposition. When it was
decided to take the offensive, the question arose whether Otho in
person should take part in the battle or hold himself in reserve. His
evil counsellors again carried their point. Otho was to retire to
Brixellum,[287] and, by withdrawing from the hazards of the field,
reserve himself for the supreme control of the campaign and of the
empire. To this Paulinus and Celsus offered no further opposition, for
fear of seeming to endanger the person of their prince. From this day
dates the decline of Otho's party. Not only did he take with him a
considerable force of the Guards, Body Guard, and cavalry, but the
spirit of the troops who remained behind was broken. The men trusted
no one but Otho, and Otho no one but the men. His generals were under
suspicion and their authority left in doubt. [288]
None of these arrangements failed to reach the ears of the 34
Vitellians. Desertions were frequent, as they always are in civil war,
and the scouts in their eagerness to discover the enemy's plans always
failed to conceal their own. Caecina and Valens, counting on the fatal
impatience of the enemy, remained quietly on their guard to see what
they would do: for it is always wisdom to profit by another's folly.
Feigning an intention of crossing the Po, they began to construct a
bridge, partly as a demonstration against the gladiators[289] on the
opposite bank, partly to find something for their idle troops to do.
Boats were placed at equal intervals with their heads up stream and
fastened together by strong wooden planks. They also cast anchors from
them to ensure the solidity of the bridge, but they allowed the
hawsers to drift slack, so that when the river rose the boats might
all rise with it without the line being broken. To guard the bridge a
high tower was built out on the end boat, from which they could
repulse the enemy with various artillery. Meanwhile the Othonians had
built a tower on the bank and kept up a steady shower of stones and
torches.
In midstream there was an island, to which the gladiators tried to 35
make their way in boats, but the Germans swam over and got there
first. When a good number of them had swam across, Macer manned some
Liburnian cruisers[290] and attacked them with the bravest of his
gladiators. But they fought with less courage than soldiers, and from
their unsteady boats they could not shoot so well as the others, who
had a firm footing on the bank. Swaying this way and that in their
alarm, the sailors and the marines were beginning to get in each
other's way, when the Germans actually leapt into the shallows, caught
hold of the boats by the stern, and either clambered up by the
gangways or sunk them bodily with their own hands. All this took place
before the eyes of both armies[291], and the higher rose the spirits
of the Vitellians, the greater became the indignation of the Othonians
against Macer, the author and cause of their disaster. The 36
remainder of the boats were eventually dragged off,[292] and the
battle ended in flight. The army demanded Macer's execution. He had
been actually wounded by a lance that had been flung at him, and the
soldiers were rushing on him with drawn swords when some tribunes and
centurions intervened and rescued him.
Soon after this, Vestricius Spurinna, on Otho's orders, brought up a
reinforcement of the Guards, leaving behind a small garrison at
Placentia, and before long, Otho sent the consul-elect, Flavius
Sabinus,[293] to take command of Macer's force. This change pleased
the soldiers, but the frequent mutinies made the generals unwilling to
assume such a perilous command.
In some of my authorities[294] I find a statement that either a 37
growing fear of war or dislike of the two emperors, whose
discreditable misconduct grew daily more notorious, led the armies to
hesitate whether they should not give up the struggle and either
themselves combine to choose an emperor or refer the choice to the
senate. This, it is suggested, was the motive of Otho's generals in
advising delay, and Paulinus in particular had high hopes, since he
was the senior ex-consul, and a distinguished general who had earned
a brilliant reputation by his operations in Britain.
to a decisive engagement. His brother Titianus and Proculus, the
prefect of the Guard, with all the impatience of inexperience, stoutly
maintained that fortune and Providence, and Otho's own good genius
inspired his policy, and would inspire its performance. They had
descended to flattery by way of checking opposition. When it was
decided to take the offensive, the question arose whether Otho in
person should take part in the battle or hold himself in reserve. His
evil counsellors again carried their point. Otho was to retire to
Brixellum,[287] and, by withdrawing from the hazards of the field,
reserve himself for the supreme control of the campaign and of the
empire. To this Paulinus and Celsus offered no further opposition, for
fear of seeming to endanger the person of their prince. From this day
dates the decline of Otho's party. Not only did he take with him a
considerable force of the Guards, Body Guard, and cavalry, but the
spirit of the troops who remained behind was broken. The men trusted
no one but Otho, and Otho no one but the men. His generals were under
suspicion and their authority left in doubt. [288]
None of these arrangements failed to reach the ears of the 34
Vitellians. Desertions were frequent, as they always are in civil war,
and the scouts in their eagerness to discover the enemy's plans always
failed to conceal their own. Caecina and Valens, counting on the fatal
impatience of the enemy, remained quietly on their guard to see what
they would do: for it is always wisdom to profit by another's folly.
Feigning an intention of crossing the Po, they began to construct a
bridge, partly as a demonstration against the gladiators[289] on the
opposite bank, partly to find something for their idle troops to do.
Boats were placed at equal intervals with their heads up stream and
fastened together by strong wooden planks. They also cast anchors from
them to ensure the solidity of the bridge, but they allowed the
hawsers to drift slack, so that when the river rose the boats might
all rise with it without the line being broken. To guard the bridge a
high tower was built out on the end boat, from which they could
repulse the enemy with various artillery. Meanwhile the Othonians had
built a tower on the bank and kept up a steady shower of stones and
torches.
In midstream there was an island, to which the gladiators tried to 35
make their way in boats, but the Germans swam over and got there
first. When a good number of them had swam across, Macer manned some
Liburnian cruisers[290] and attacked them with the bravest of his
gladiators. But they fought with less courage than soldiers, and from
their unsteady boats they could not shoot so well as the others, who
had a firm footing on the bank. Swaying this way and that in their
alarm, the sailors and the marines were beginning to get in each
other's way, when the Germans actually leapt into the shallows, caught
hold of the boats by the stern, and either clambered up by the
gangways or sunk them bodily with their own hands. All this took place
before the eyes of both armies[291], and the higher rose the spirits
of the Vitellians, the greater became the indignation of the Othonians
against Macer, the author and cause of their disaster. The 36
remainder of the boats were eventually dragged off,[292] and the
battle ended in flight. The army demanded Macer's execution. He had
been actually wounded by a lance that had been flung at him, and the
soldiers were rushing on him with drawn swords when some tribunes and
centurions intervened and rescued him.
Soon after this, Vestricius Spurinna, on Otho's orders, brought up a
reinforcement of the Guards, leaving behind a small garrison at
Placentia, and before long, Otho sent the consul-elect, Flavius
Sabinus,[293] to take command of Macer's force. This change pleased
the soldiers, but the frequent mutinies made the generals unwilling to
assume such a perilous command.
In some of my authorities[294] I find a statement that either a 37
growing fear of war or dislike of the two emperors, whose
discreditable misconduct grew daily more notorious, led the armies to
hesitate whether they should not give up the struggle and either
themselves combine to choose an emperor or refer the choice to the
senate. This, it is suggested, was the motive of Otho's generals in
advising delay, and Paulinus in particular had high hopes, since he
was the senior ex-consul, and a distinguished general who had earned
a brilliant reputation by his operations in Britain.
