The
rhetorical
figure, which is called exclamation, so frequent with
Epicurus [d] and Metrodorus, will add to a discourse those sudden
breaks of passion, which give motion, strength, and vehemence.
Epicurus [d] and Metrodorus, will add to a discourse those sudden
breaks of passion, which give motion, strength, and vehemence.
Tacitus
To form that
illustrious character, it was not thought necessary to declaim in the
schools of rhetoricians [a], or to make a vain parade in fictitious
controversies, which were not only void of all reality, but even of a
shadow of probability. Our ancestors pursued a different plan: they
stored their minds with just ideas of moral good and evil; with the
rules of right and wrong, and the fair and foul in human transactions.
These, on every controverted point, are the orator's province. In
courts of law, just and unjust undergo his discussion; in political
debate, between what is expedient and honourable, it is his to draw
the line; and those questions are so blended in their nature, that
they enter into every cause. On such important topics, who can hope to
bring variety of matter, and to dignify that matter with style and
sentiment, if he has not, beforehand, enlarged his mind with the
knowledge of human nature? with the laws of moral obligation? the
deformity of vice, the beauty of virtue, and other points which do not
immediately belong to the theory of ethics?
The orator, who has enriched his mind with these materials, may be
truly said to have acquired the powers of persuasion. He who knows the
nature of indignation, will be able to kindle or allay that passion in
the breast of the judge; and the advocate who has considered the
effect of compassion, and from what secret springs it flows, will best
know how to soften the mind, and melt it into tenderness. It is by
these secrets of his art that the orator gains his influence. Whether
he has to do with the prejudiced, the angry, the envious, the
melancholy, or the timid, he can bridle their various passions, and
hold the reins in his own hand. According to the disposition of his
audience, he will know when to check the workings of the heart, and
when to raise them to their full tumult of emotion.
Some critics are chiefly pleased with that close mode of oratory,
which in a laconic manner states the facts, and forms an immediate
conclusion: in that case, it is obvious how necessary it is to be a
complete master of the rules of logic. Others delight in a more open,
free, and copious style, where the arguments are drawn from topics of
general knowledge; for this purpose, the peripatetic school [b] will
supply the orator with ample materials. The academic philosopher [c]
will inspire him with warmth and energy; Plato will give the sublime,
and Xenophon that equal flow which charms us in that amiable writer.
The rhetorical figure, which is called exclamation, so frequent with
Epicurus [d] and Metrodorus, will add to a discourse those sudden
breaks of passion, which give motion, strength, and vehemence.
It is not for the stoic school, nor for their imaginary wise man, that
I am laying down rules. I am forming an orator, whose business it is,
not to adhere to one sect, but to go the round of all the arts and
sciences. Accordingly we find, that the great master of ancient
eloquence laid their foundation in a thorough study of the civil law,
and to that fund they added grammar, music, and geometry. The fact is,
in most of the causes that occur, perhaps in every cause, a due
knowledge of the whole system of jurisprudence is an indispensable
requisite. There are likewise many subjects of litigation, in which an
acquaintance with other sciences is of the highest use.
XXXII. Am I to be told, that to gain some slight information on
particular subjects, as occasion may require, will sufficiently answer
the purposes of an orator? In answer to this, let it be observed, that
the application of what we draw from our own fund, is very different
from the use we make of what we borrow. Whether we speak from digested
knowledge, or the mere suggestion of others, the effect is soon
perceived. Add to this, that conflux of ideas with which the different
sciences enrich the mind, gives an air of dignity to whatever we say,
even in cases where that depth of knowledge is not required. Science
adorns the speaker at all times, and, where it is least expected,
confers a grace that charms every hearer; the man of erudition feels
it, and the unlettered part of the audience acknowledge the effect
without knowing the cause. A murmur of applause ensues; the speaker is
allowed to have laid in a store of knowledge; he possesses all the
powers of persuasion, and then is called an orator indeed.
I take the liberty to add, if we aspire to that honourable
appellation, that there is no way but that which I have chalked out.
No man was ever yet a complete orator, and, I affirm, never can be,
unless, like the soldier marching to the field of battle, he enters
the forum armed at all points with the sciences and the liberal arts.
Is that the case in these our modern times?
illustrious character, it was not thought necessary to declaim in the
schools of rhetoricians [a], or to make a vain parade in fictitious
controversies, which were not only void of all reality, but even of a
shadow of probability. Our ancestors pursued a different plan: they
stored their minds with just ideas of moral good and evil; with the
rules of right and wrong, and the fair and foul in human transactions.
These, on every controverted point, are the orator's province. In
courts of law, just and unjust undergo his discussion; in political
debate, between what is expedient and honourable, it is his to draw
the line; and those questions are so blended in their nature, that
they enter into every cause. On such important topics, who can hope to
bring variety of matter, and to dignify that matter with style and
sentiment, if he has not, beforehand, enlarged his mind with the
knowledge of human nature? with the laws of moral obligation? the
deformity of vice, the beauty of virtue, and other points which do not
immediately belong to the theory of ethics?
The orator, who has enriched his mind with these materials, may be
truly said to have acquired the powers of persuasion. He who knows the
nature of indignation, will be able to kindle or allay that passion in
the breast of the judge; and the advocate who has considered the
effect of compassion, and from what secret springs it flows, will best
know how to soften the mind, and melt it into tenderness. It is by
these secrets of his art that the orator gains his influence. Whether
he has to do with the prejudiced, the angry, the envious, the
melancholy, or the timid, he can bridle their various passions, and
hold the reins in his own hand. According to the disposition of his
audience, he will know when to check the workings of the heart, and
when to raise them to their full tumult of emotion.
Some critics are chiefly pleased with that close mode of oratory,
which in a laconic manner states the facts, and forms an immediate
conclusion: in that case, it is obvious how necessary it is to be a
complete master of the rules of logic. Others delight in a more open,
free, and copious style, where the arguments are drawn from topics of
general knowledge; for this purpose, the peripatetic school [b] will
supply the orator with ample materials. The academic philosopher [c]
will inspire him with warmth and energy; Plato will give the sublime,
and Xenophon that equal flow which charms us in that amiable writer.
The rhetorical figure, which is called exclamation, so frequent with
Epicurus [d] and Metrodorus, will add to a discourse those sudden
breaks of passion, which give motion, strength, and vehemence.
It is not for the stoic school, nor for their imaginary wise man, that
I am laying down rules. I am forming an orator, whose business it is,
not to adhere to one sect, but to go the round of all the arts and
sciences. Accordingly we find, that the great master of ancient
eloquence laid their foundation in a thorough study of the civil law,
and to that fund they added grammar, music, and geometry. The fact is,
in most of the causes that occur, perhaps in every cause, a due
knowledge of the whole system of jurisprudence is an indispensable
requisite. There are likewise many subjects of litigation, in which an
acquaintance with other sciences is of the highest use.
XXXII. Am I to be told, that to gain some slight information on
particular subjects, as occasion may require, will sufficiently answer
the purposes of an orator? In answer to this, let it be observed, that
the application of what we draw from our own fund, is very different
from the use we make of what we borrow. Whether we speak from digested
knowledge, or the mere suggestion of others, the effect is soon
perceived. Add to this, that conflux of ideas with which the different
sciences enrich the mind, gives an air of dignity to whatever we say,
even in cases where that depth of knowledge is not required. Science
adorns the speaker at all times, and, where it is least expected,
confers a grace that charms every hearer; the man of erudition feels
it, and the unlettered part of the audience acknowledge the effect
without knowing the cause. A murmur of applause ensues; the speaker is
allowed to have laid in a store of knowledge; he possesses all the
powers of persuasion, and then is called an orator indeed.
I take the liberty to add, if we aspire to that honourable
appellation, that there is no way but that which I have chalked out.
No man was ever yet a complete orator, and, I affirm, never can be,
unless, like the soldier marching to the field of battle, he enters
the forum armed at all points with the sciences and the liberal arts.
Is that the case in these our modern times?