[e] Cicero is here said to have been a complete master of philosophy,
which, according to Quintilian, was divided into three branches,
namely, physics, ethics, and logic.
which, according to Quintilian, was divided into three branches,
namely, physics, ethics, and logic.
Tacitus
_ _De Claris Orat.
_ s.
309.
[d] Cicero gives an account of his travels, which he undertook, after
having employed two years in the business of the forum, where he
gained an early reputation. At Athens, he passed six months with
Antiochus, the principal philosopher of the old academy, and, under
the direction of that able master, resumed those abstract
speculations which he had cultivated from his earliest youth. Nor did
he neglect his rhetorical exercises. In that pursuit, he was assisted
by Demetrius, the Syrian, who was allowed to be a skilful preceptor.
He passed from Greece into Asia; and, in the course of his travels
through that country, he lived in constant habits with Menippus of
Stratonica; a man eminent for his learning; who, if to be neither
frivolous, nor unintelligible, is the character of Attic eloquence,
might fairly be called a disciple of that school. He met with many
other professors of rhetoric, such as Dionysius of Magnesia, Æschylus
of Cnidos, and Zenocles of Adramytus; but not content with their
assistance, he went to Rhodes, and renewed his friendship with MOLO,
whom he had heard at Rome, and knew to be an able pleader in real
causes; a fine writer, and a judicious critic, who could, with a just
discernment of the beauties as well as the faults of a composition,
point out the road to excellence, and improve the taste of his
scholars. In his attention to the Roman orator, the point he aimed at
(Cicero will not say that he succeeded) was, to lop away superfluous
branches, and confine within its proper channel a stream of
eloquence, too apt to swell above all bounds, and overflow its banks.
After two years thus spent in the pursuit of knowledge, and
improvement in his oratorical profession, Cicero returned to Rome
almost a new man. _Is (MOLO) dedit operam (si modo id consequi potuit)
ut nimis redundantes nos, et superfluentes juvenili quadam dicendi
impunitate, et licentiâ, reprimeret, et quasi extra ripas diffluentes
cœrceret. Ita recepi me biennio post, non modo exercitatior, sed propè
mutatus. _ See _De Claris Oratoribus_, s. 315 and 316.
[e] Cicero is here said to have been a complete master of philosophy,
which, according to Quintilian, was divided into three branches,
namely, physics, ethics, and logic. It has been mentioned in this
section, note [c], that Cicero called logic a contracted and close
mode of eloquence. That observation is fully explained by Quintilian.
Speaking of logic, the use, he says, of that contentious art, consists
in just definition, which presents to the mind the precise idea; and
in nice discrimination, which marks the essential difference of
things. It is this faculty that throws a sudden light on every
difficult question, removes all ambiguity, clears up what was
doubtful, divides, develops, and separates, and then collects the
argument to a point. But the orator must not be too fond of this close
combat. The minute attention, which logic requires, will exclude what
is of higher value; while it aims at precision, the vigour of the mind
is lost in subtlety. We often see men, who argue with wonderful craft;
but, when petty controversy will no longer serve their purpose, we see
the same men without warmth or energy, cold, languid, and unequal to
the conflict; like those little animals, which are brisk in narrow
places, and by their agility baffle their pursuers, but in the open
field are soon overpowered. _Hæc pars dialectica, sive illam dicere
malimus disputatricem, ut est utilis sæpe et finitionibus, et
comprehensionibus, et separandis quæ sunt differentia, et resolvendâ
ambiguitate, et distinguendo, dividendo, illiciendo, implicando; ita
si totum sibi vindicaverit in foro certamen, obstabit melioribus, et
sectas ad tenuitatem vires ipsâ subtilitate consumet. Itaque reperias
quosdam in disputando mirè callidos; cum ab illâ verò cavillatione
discesserint, non magis sufficere in aliquo graviori actu, quam parva
quædam animalia, quæ in angustiis mobilia, campo deprehenduntur. _
Quint. lib. xii. cap. 2.
Ethics, or moral philosophy, the same great critic holds to be
indispensably requisite.
309.
[d] Cicero gives an account of his travels, which he undertook, after
having employed two years in the business of the forum, where he
gained an early reputation. At Athens, he passed six months with
Antiochus, the principal philosopher of the old academy, and, under
the direction of that able master, resumed those abstract
speculations which he had cultivated from his earliest youth. Nor did
he neglect his rhetorical exercises. In that pursuit, he was assisted
by Demetrius, the Syrian, who was allowed to be a skilful preceptor.
He passed from Greece into Asia; and, in the course of his travels
through that country, he lived in constant habits with Menippus of
Stratonica; a man eminent for his learning; who, if to be neither
frivolous, nor unintelligible, is the character of Attic eloquence,
might fairly be called a disciple of that school. He met with many
other professors of rhetoric, such as Dionysius of Magnesia, Æschylus
of Cnidos, and Zenocles of Adramytus; but not content with their
assistance, he went to Rhodes, and renewed his friendship with MOLO,
whom he had heard at Rome, and knew to be an able pleader in real
causes; a fine writer, and a judicious critic, who could, with a just
discernment of the beauties as well as the faults of a composition,
point out the road to excellence, and improve the taste of his
scholars. In his attention to the Roman orator, the point he aimed at
(Cicero will not say that he succeeded) was, to lop away superfluous
branches, and confine within its proper channel a stream of
eloquence, too apt to swell above all bounds, and overflow its banks.
After two years thus spent in the pursuit of knowledge, and
improvement in his oratorical profession, Cicero returned to Rome
almost a new man. _Is (MOLO) dedit operam (si modo id consequi potuit)
ut nimis redundantes nos, et superfluentes juvenili quadam dicendi
impunitate, et licentiâ, reprimeret, et quasi extra ripas diffluentes
cœrceret. Ita recepi me biennio post, non modo exercitatior, sed propè
mutatus. _ See _De Claris Oratoribus_, s. 315 and 316.
[e] Cicero is here said to have been a complete master of philosophy,
which, according to Quintilian, was divided into three branches,
namely, physics, ethics, and logic. It has been mentioned in this
section, note [c], that Cicero called logic a contracted and close
mode of eloquence. That observation is fully explained by Quintilian.
Speaking of logic, the use, he says, of that contentious art, consists
in just definition, which presents to the mind the precise idea; and
in nice discrimination, which marks the essential difference of
things. It is this faculty that throws a sudden light on every
difficult question, removes all ambiguity, clears up what was
doubtful, divides, develops, and separates, and then collects the
argument to a point. But the orator must not be too fond of this close
combat. The minute attention, which logic requires, will exclude what
is of higher value; while it aims at precision, the vigour of the mind
is lost in subtlety. We often see men, who argue with wonderful craft;
but, when petty controversy will no longer serve their purpose, we see
the same men without warmth or energy, cold, languid, and unequal to
the conflict; like those little animals, which are brisk in narrow
places, and by their agility baffle their pursuers, but in the open
field are soon overpowered. _Hæc pars dialectica, sive illam dicere
malimus disputatricem, ut est utilis sæpe et finitionibus, et
comprehensionibus, et separandis quæ sunt differentia, et resolvendâ
ambiguitate, et distinguendo, dividendo, illiciendo, implicando; ita
si totum sibi vindicaverit in foro certamen, obstabit melioribus, et
sectas ad tenuitatem vires ipsâ subtilitate consumet. Itaque reperias
quosdam in disputando mirè callidos; cum ab illâ verò cavillatione
discesserint, non magis sufficere in aliquo graviori actu, quam parva
quædam animalia, quæ in angustiis mobilia, campo deprehenduntur. _
Quint. lib. xii. cap. 2.
Ethics, or moral philosophy, the same great critic holds to be
indispensably requisite.
