In Raetia and the Gallic provinces some
centurions and men carrying letters and edicts from Vespasian were
taken prisoners and sent to Vitellius, who had them executed.
centurions and men carrying letters and edicts from Vespasian were
taken prisoners and sent to Vitellius, who had them executed.
Tacitus
So the emperor's flattering friends began to explain it all
away: what was the defection of a single legion, while the loyalty of
the other armies remained unshaken? Vitellius himself used the same
language to the soldiers. He accused the men, who had been recently
discharged from the Guards,[446] of spreading false rumours, and kept
assuring them there was no fear of civil war. All mention of Vespasian
was suppressed, and soldiers were sent round the city to frighten
people into silence, which, of course, did more than anything else to
make them talk.
Vitellius, nevertheless, sent for reinforcements from Germany, 97
Britain, and the Spanish provinces, though with a lack of urgency
which was intended to conceal his straits. The provinces and their
governors showed the same want of enthusiasm. Hordeonius Flaccus,[447]
who had suspicions of the Batavi, was distracted with a war of his
own,[448] while Vettius Bolanus[449] never had Britain under complete
control: nor was the loyally of either beyond doubt. The Spanish
provinces, where there was at the time no consular governor,[450] were
equally slow. The three officers in command of the legions held an
equal authority, and if Vitellius' cause had prospered, would have
each outbid the other for his favour: but they all shared the resolve
to leave his misfortunes alone. In Africa the legion and auxiliaries
enlisted by Clodius Macer, and subsequently disbanded by Galba,[451]
took service again at Vitellius' orders, and at the same time all the
young men of the province eagerly enlisted. Vitellius had been an
honest and popular pro-consul in Africa, while Vespasian had been
distrusted and disliked. The provincials took this as an earnest of
their reigns; but experience proved them wrong.
The military legate Valerius Festus[452] at first loyally seconded 98
the enthusiasm of the province. After a while he began to waver. In
his official letters and edicts he still acknowledged Vitellius, while
in secret communication with Vespasian and ready to support whichever
party proved successful.
In Raetia and the Gallic provinces some
centurions and men carrying letters and edicts from Vespasian were
taken prisoners and sent to Vitellius, who had them executed. But most
of these envoys escaped capture either by their own ingenuity or the
loyal help of friends. Thus, while Vitellius' plans were known,
Vespasian's were for the most part still a secret. This was partly due
to Vitellius' negligence, but also to the fact that the garrisons on
the Pannonian Alps stopped all messengers. By sea, too, the
Etesian[453] winds from the north-west favoured ships sailing
eastward, but hindered the voyage from the East.
Terrified at last by the imminence of invasion and the alarming 99
news that reached him from all quarters, Vitellius instructed Caecina
and Valens to prepare for war. Caecina was sent on ahead, Valens, who
was just recovering from a serious illness, being delayed by his weak
state of health. Great, indeed, was the change in the appearance of
the German army as it marched out of Rome. There was neither energy in
their muscles nor fire in their hearts. Slowly the column straggled
on, their horses spiritless, their arms neglected. The men grumbled at
the sun, the dust, the weather, and were as ready to quarrel as they
were unwilling to work. To these disadvantages were added Caecina's
inveterate self-seeking and his newly-acquired indolence. An overdose
of success had made him slack and self-indulgent, or, if he was
plotting treachery, this may have been one of his devices for
demoralizing the army. It has often been believed that it was Flavius
Sabinus[454] who, using Rubrius Gallus as his agent, tampered with
Caecina's loyalty by promising that, if he came over, Vespasian would
ratify any conditions. It may have occurred also to Caecina to
remember his quarrels and rivalry with Valens, and to consider that,
as he did not stand first with Vitellius, he had better acquire credit
and influence with the new emperor.
After taking an affectionate and respectful farewell of Vitellius, 100
Caecina dispatched a body of cavalry to occupy Cremona.
away: what was the defection of a single legion, while the loyalty of
the other armies remained unshaken? Vitellius himself used the same
language to the soldiers. He accused the men, who had been recently
discharged from the Guards,[446] of spreading false rumours, and kept
assuring them there was no fear of civil war. All mention of Vespasian
was suppressed, and soldiers were sent round the city to frighten
people into silence, which, of course, did more than anything else to
make them talk.
Vitellius, nevertheless, sent for reinforcements from Germany, 97
Britain, and the Spanish provinces, though with a lack of urgency
which was intended to conceal his straits. The provinces and their
governors showed the same want of enthusiasm. Hordeonius Flaccus,[447]
who had suspicions of the Batavi, was distracted with a war of his
own,[448] while Vettius Bolanus[449] never had Britain under complete
control: nor was the loyally of either beyond doubt. The Spanish
provinces, where there was at the time no consular governor,[450] were
equally slow. The three officers in command of the legions held an
equal authority, and if Vitellius' cause had prospered, would have
each outbid the other for his favour: but they all shared the resolve
to leave his misfortunes alone. In Africa the legion and auxiliaries
enlisted by Clodius Macer, and subsequently disbanded by Galba,[451]
took service again at Vitellius' orders, and at the same time all the
young men of the province eagerly enlisted. Vitellius had been an
honest and popular pro-consul in Africa, while Vespasian had been
distrusted and disliked. The provincials took this as an earnest of
their reigns; but experience proved them wrong.
The military legate Valerius Festus[452] at first loyally seconded 98
the enthusiasm of the province. After a while he began to waver. In
his official letters and edicts he still acknowledged Vitellius, while
in secret communication with Vespasian and ready to support whichever
party proved successful.
In Raetia and the Gallic provinces some
centurions and men carrying letters and edicts from Vespasian were
taken prisoners and sent to Vitellius, who had them executed. But most
of these envoys escaped capture either by their own ingenuity or the
loyal help of friends. Thus, while Vitellius' plans were known,
Vespasian's were for the most part still a secret. This was partly due
to Vitellius' negligence, but also to the fact that the garrisons on
the Pannonian Alps stopped all messengers. By sea, too, the
Etesian[453] winds from the north-west favoured ships sailing
eastward, but hindered the voyage from the East.
Terrified at last by the imminence of invasion and the alarming 99
news that reached him from all quarters, Vitellius instructed Caecina
and Valens to prepare for war. Caecina was sent on ahead, Valens, who
was just recovering from a serious illness, being delayed by his weak
state of health. Great, indeed, was the change in the appearance of
the German army as it marched out of Rome. There was neither energy in
their muscles nor fire in their hearts. Slowly the column straggled
on, their horses spiritless, their arms neglected. The men grumbled at
the sun, the dust, the weather, and were as ready to quarrel as they
were unwilling to work. To these disadvantages were added Caecina's
inveterate self-seeking and his newly-acquired indolence. An overdose
of success had made him slack and self-indulgent, or, if he was
plotting treachery, this may have been one of his devices for
demoralizing the army. It has often been believed that it was Flavius
Sabinus[454] who, using Rubrius Gallus as his agent, tampered with
Caecina's loyalty by promising that, if he came over, Vespasian would
ratify any conditions. It may have occurred also to Caecina to
remember his quarrels and rivalry with Valens, and to consider that,
as he did not stand first with Vitellius, he had better acquire credit
and influence with the new emperor.
After taking an affectionate and respectful farewell of Vitellius, 100
Caecina dispatched a body of cavalry to occupy Cremona.
