Are
those who offer it ready to run the risk themselves?
those who offer it ready to run the risk themselves?
Tacitus
But a war of such magnitude demands delay.
High as
were his hopes, Vespasian often calculated his risks. He realized that
it would be a critical day for him when he committed his sixty summers
and his two young sons to the chances of war. In his private ambitions
a man may feel his way and take less or more from fortune's hands
according as he feels inclined, but when one covets a throne there is
no alternative between the zenith of success and headlong ruin.
Moreover, he always kept in view the strength of the German army, 75
which, as a soldier, he realized. His own legions, he knew, had no
experience of civil war, while Vitellius' troops were fresh from
victory: and the defeated party were richer in grievances than in
troops. Civil strife had undermined the loyalty of the troops: there
was danger in each single man. What would be the good of all his horse
and foot, if one or two traitors should seek the reward the enemy
offered and assassinate him then and there? It was thus that
Scribonianus[395] had been killed in Claudius' reign, and his
murderer, Volaginius, raised from a common soldier to the highest
rank. It is easier to move men in the mass than to take precautions
against them singly.
These anxieties made Vespasian hesitate. Meanwhile the other 76
generals and his friends continued to encourage him. At last Mucianus
after several private interviews went so far as to address him in
public. 'Everybody,' he said, 'who plans some great exploit is bound
to consider whether his enterprise serves both the public interest and
his own reputation, and whether it is easily practicable or, at any
rate, not impossible. He must also weigh the advice which he gets.
Are
those who offer it ready to run the risk themselves? And, if fortune
favours, who gains the glory? I myself, Vespasian, call you to the
throne. How much that may benefit the country and make you famous it
lies with you--under Providence--to decide. You need not be afraid
that I may seem to flatter you. It is more of an insult than a
compliment to be chosen to succeed Vitellius. It is not against the
powerful intellect of the sainted Augustus that we are in revolt; not
against the cautious prudence of the old Tiberius; nor even against a
long-established imperial family like that of Caligula, Claudius or
Nero. You even gave way to Galba's ancient lineage. To remain inactive
any longer, to leave your country to ruin and disgrace, that would be
sheer sloth and cowardice, even if such slavery were as safe for you
as it would be dishonourable. The time is long past when you could be
merely _suspected_ of ambition: the throne is now your only refuge.
Have you forgotten Corbulo's murder? [396] He was a man of better
family than we, I admit, but so was Nero more nobly born than
Vitellius. A man who is feared always seems illustrious enough to
those who fear him. That an army can make an emperor Vitellius himself
has proved. He had neither experience nor military reputation, but
merely rose on Galba's unpopularity. Even Otho fell not by the
strategy or strength of his opponent, but by his own precipitate
despair.
were his hopes, Vespasian often calculated his risks. He realized that
it would be a critical day for him when he committed his sixty summers
and his two young sons to the chances of war. In his private ambitions
a man may feel his way and take less or more from fortune's hands
according as he feels inclined, but when one covets a throne there is
no alternative between the zenith of success and headlong ruin.
Moreover, he always kept in view the strength of the German army, 75
which, as a soldier, he realized. His own legions, he knew, had no
experience of civil war, while Vitellius' troops were fresh from
victory: and the defeated party were richer in grievances than in
troops. Civil strife had undermined the loyalty of the troops: there
was danger in each single man. What would be the good of all his horse
and foot, if one or two traitors should seek the reward the enemy
offered and assassinate him then and there? It was thus that
Scribonianus[395] had been killed in Claudius' reign, and his
murderer, Volaginius, raised from a common soldier to the highest
rank. It is easier to move men in the mass than to take precautions
against them singly.
These anxieties made Vespasian hesitate. Meanwhile the other 76
generals and his friends continued to encourage him. At last Mucianus
after several private interviews went so far as to address him in
public. 'Everybody,' he said, 'who plans some great exploit is bound
to consider whether his enterprise serves both the public interest and
his own reputation, and whether it is easily practicable or, at any
rate, not impossible. He must also weigh the advice which he gets.
Are
those who offer it ready to run the risk themselves? And, if fortune
favours, who gains the glory? I myself, Vespasian, call you to the
throne. How much that may benefit the country and make you famous it
lies with you--under Providence--to decide. You need not be afraid
that I may seem to flatter you. It is more of an insult than a
compliment to be chosen to succeed Vitellius. It is not against the
powerful intellect of the sainted Augustus that we are in revolt; not
against the cautious prudence of the old Tiberius; nor even against a
long-established imperial family like that of Caligula, Claudius or
Nero. You even gave way to Galba's ancient lineage. To remain inactive
any longer, to leave your country to ruin and disgrace, that would be
sheer sloth and cowardice, even if such slavery were as safe for you
as it would be dishonourable. The time is long past when you could be
merely _suspected_ of ambition: the throne is now your only refuge.
Have you forgotten Corbulo's murder? [396] He was a man of better
family than we, I admit, but so was Nero more nobly born than
Vitellius. A man who is feared always seems illustrious enough to
those who fear him. That an army can make an emperor Vitellius himself
has proved. He had neither experience nor military reputation, but
merely rose on Galba's unpopularity. Even Otho fell not by the
strategy or strength of his opponent, but by his own precipitate
despair.
