After a while
he gave way to his natural cowardice and the fears of his
subordinates, who were distressed by the thought that the loyalty of
the auxiliaries was doubtful and that the legions had been recruited
by a hurried levy.
he gave way to his natural cowardice and the fears of his
subordinates, who were distressed by the thought that the loyalty of
the auxiliaries was doubtful and that the legions had been recruited
by a hurried levy.
Tacitus
To this
force he added a regiment of Batavian cavalry, who, though their
loyalty had long ago succumbed, still concealed the fact, because they
hoped their desertion would fetch a higher price, if they actually
betrayed the Romans on the field. Civilis set the standards of the
defeated cohorts[292] round him in a ring to keep their fresh honours
before the eyes of his men, and to terrify the enemy by reminding them
of their disaster. He also gave orders that his own mother and sisters
and all the wives and small children of his soldiers should be
stationed in the rear to spur them to victory or shame them if they
were beaten. [293] When his line raised their battle-cry, the men
singing and the women shrieking, the legions and their auxiliaries
replied with a comparatively feeble cheer, for their left wing had
been exposed by the desertion of the Batavian cavalry, who promptly
turned against us. However, despite the confusion, the legionaries
gripped their swords and kept their places. Then the Ubian and
Treviran auxiliaries broke in shameful flight and went wandering all
over the country. The Germans pressed hard on their heels and
meanwhile the legions could make good their escape into the camp,
which was called 'Castra Vetera'. [294] Claudius Labeo, who commanded
the Batavian cavalry, had opposed Civilis as a rival in some petty
municipal dispute. Civilis was afraid that, if he killed him, he might
offend his countrymen, while if he spared him his presence would give
rise to dissension; so he sent him off by sea to the Frisii.
It was at this time that the cohorts of Batavians and 19
Canninefates, on their way to Rome under orders from Vitellius,
received the message which Civilis had sent to them. [295] They
promptly fell into a ferment of unruly insolence and demanded a
special grant as payment for their journey, double pay, and an
increase in the number of their cavalry. [296] Although all these
things had been promised by Vitellius they had no hope of obtaining
them, but wanted an excuse for rebellion. Flaccus made many
concessions, but the only result was that they redoubled their vigour
and demanded what they felt sure he would refuse. Paying no further
heed to him they made for Lower Germany, to join Civilis. Flaccus
summoned the tribunes and centurions and debated with them whether he
should use force to punish this defiance of authority.
After a while
he gave way to his natural cowardice and the fears of his
subordinates, who were distressed by the thought that the loyalty of
the auxiliaries was doubtful and that the legions had been recruited
by a hurried levy. It was decided, therefore, to keep the soldiers in
camp. [297] However, he soon changed his mind when he found himself
criticized by the very men whose advice he had taken. He now seemed
bent on pursuit, and wrote to Herennius Gallus in command of the First
legion, who was holding Bonn, telling him to bar the path of the
Batavians, and promising that he and his army would follow hard upon
their heels. The rebels might certainly have been crushed had Flaccus
and Gallus each advanced their forces from opposite directions and
thus surrounded them. But Flaccus soon gave up the idea, and wrote
another letter to Gallus, warning him to let the rebels pass
undisturbed. This gave rise to a suspicion that the generals were
purposely promoting the war; and all the disasters which had already
occurred or were feared in the future, were attributed not to the
soldiers' inefficiency or the strength of the enemy, but to the
treachery of the generals.
On nearing the camp at Bonn, the Batavians sent forward a 20
messenger to explain their intentions to Herennius Gallus. Against the
Romans, for whom they had fought so often, they had no wish to make
war: but they were worn out after a long and unprofitable term of
service and wanted to go home and rest. If no one opposed them they
would march peaceably by; but if hostility was offered they would find
a passage at the point of the sword. Gallus hesitated, but his men
induced him to risk an engagement. Three thousand legionaries, some
hastily recruited Belgic auxiliaries, and a mob of peasants and
camp-followers, who were as cowardly in action as they were boastful
before it, came pouring out simultaneously from all the gates, hoping
with their superior numbers to surround the Batavians. But these were
experienced veterans. They formed up into columns[298] in deep
formation that defied assault on front, flank, or rear. They thus
pierced our thinner line. The Belgae giving way, the legion was driven
back and ran in terror to reach the trench and the gates of the camp.
force he added a regiment of Batavian cavalry, who, though their
loyalty had long ago succumbed, still concealed the fact, because they
hoped their desertion would fetch a higher price, if they actually
betrayed the Romans on the field. Civilis set the standards of the
defeated cohorts[292] round him in a ring to keep their fresh honours
before the eyes of his men, and to terrify the enemy by reminding them
of their disaster. He also gave orders that his own mother and sisters
and all the wives and small children of his soldiers should be
stationed in the rear to spur them to victory or shame them if they
were beaten. [293] When his line raised their battle-cry, the men
singing and the women shrieking, the legions and their auxiliaries
replied with a comparatively feeble cheer, for their left wing had
been exposed by the desertion of the Batavian cavalry, who promptly
turned against us. However, despite the confusion, the legionaries
gripped their swords and kept their places. Then the Ubian and
Treviran auxiliaries broke in shameful flight and went wandering all
over the country. The Germans pressed hard on their heels and
meanwhile the legions could make good their escape into the camp,
which was called 'Castra Vetera'. [294] Claudius Labeo, who commanded
the Batavian cavalry, had opposed Civilis as a rival in some petty
municipal dispute. Civilis was afraid that, if he killed him, he might
offend his countrymen, while if he spared him his presence would give
rise to dissension; so he sent him off by sea to the Frisii.
It was at this time that the cohorts of Batavians and 19
Canninefates, on their way to Rome under orders from Vitellius,
received the message which Civilis had sent to them. [295] They
promptly fell into a ferment of unruly insolence and demanded a
special grant as payment for their journey, double pay, and an
increase in the number of their cavalry. [296] Although all these
things had been promised by Vitellius they had no hope of obtaining
them, but wanted an excuse for rebellion. Flaccus made many
concessions, but the only result was that they redoubled their vigour
and demanded what they felt sure he would refuse. Paying no further
heed to him they made for Lower Germany, to join Civilis. Flaccus
summoned the tribunes and centurions and debated with them whether he
should use force to punish this defiance of authority.
After a while
he gave way to his natural cowardice and the fears of his
subordinates, who were distressed by the thought that the loyalty of
the auxiliaries was doubtful and that the legions had been recruited
by a hurried levy. It was decided, therefore, to keep the soldiers in
camp. [297] However, he soon changed his mind when he found himself
criticized by the very men whose advice he had taken. He now seemed
bent on pursuit, and wrote to Herennius Gallus in command of the First
legion, who was holding Bonn, telling him to bar the path of the
Batavians, and promising that he and his army would follow hard upon
their heels. The rebels might certainly have been crushed had Flaccus
and Gallus each advanced their forces from opposite directions and
thus surrounded them. But Flaccus soon gave up the idea, and wrote
another letter to Gallus, warning him to let the rebels pass
undisturbed. This gave rise to a suspicion that the generals were
purposely promoting the war; and all the disasters which had already
occurred or were feared in the future, were attributed not to the
soldiers' inefficiency or the strength of the enemy, but to the
treachery of the generals.
On nearing the camp at Bonn, the Batavians sent forward a 20
messenger to explain their intentions to Herennius Gallus. Against the
Romans, for whom they had fought so often, they had no wish to make
war: but they were worn out after a long and unprofitable term of
service and wanted to go home and rest. If no one opposed them they
would march peaceably by; but if hostility was offered they would find
a passage at the point of the sword. Gallus hesitated, but his men
induced him to risk an engagement. Three thousand legionaries, some
hastily recruited Belgic auxiliaries, and a mob of peasants and
camp-followers, who were as cowardly in action as they were boastful
before it, came pouring out simultaneously from all the gates, hoping
with their superior numbers to surround the Batavians. But these were
experienced veterans. They formed up into columns[298] in deep
formation that defied assault on front, flank, or rear. They thus
pierced our thinner line. The Belgae giving way, the legion was driven
back and ran in terror to reach the trench and the gates of the camp.
