Retaining a portion of his force, Civilis sent the veteran cohorts 33
with the most efficient of the German troops against Vocula and his
army.
with the most efficient of the German troops against Vocula and his
army.
Tacitus
The troops
were variously affected by the news. The Gallic auxiliaries, who had
no feelings of affection or dislike to either party and served without
sentiment, promptly took the advice of their officers and deserted
Vitellius. The veterans hesitated; under pressure from Flaccus and
their officers they eventually took the oath of allegiance, but it was
clear from their faces that their hearts were not in it, and while
repeating the rest of the formula they boggled at the name of
Vespasian, either muttering it under their breath or more often
omitting it altogether. Their suspicions were further inflamed 32
when Antonius' letter to Civilis was read out before the meeting; it
seemed to address Civilis as a member of the Flavian party, and to
argue hostility to the German army. The news was next brought to the
camp at Gelduba, where it gave rise to the same comments and the same
scenes. Montanus was sent to carry instructions to Civilis that he was
to cease from hostilities and not to make war on Rome under a false
pretext; if it was to help Vespasian that he had taken arms, he had
now achieved his object. Civilis at first replied in guarded terms.
Then, as he saw that Montanus was an impetuous person who would
welcome a revolution, he began to complain of all the dangers he had
endured in the service of Rome for the last twenty-five years. 'A fine
reward I have received,' he cried, 'for all my labours--my brother's
execution,[319] my own imprisonment,[319] and the bloodthirsty
clamours of this army, from which I claim satisfaction by natural
right since they have sought my destruction. As for you Trevirans and
all the rest that have the souls of slaves, what reward do you hope
to gain for shedding your blood so often in the cause of Rome, except
the thankless task of military service, endless taxation, and the rods
and axes of these capricious tyrants? Look at me! I have only a single
cohort under my command, and yet with the Canninefates and Batavi, a
mere fraction of the Gallic peoples, I am engaged in destroying their
great useless camp and besieging them with famine and the sword. In
short, our venture will either end in freedom or, if we are beaten, we
shall be no worse off than before. ' Having thus inflamed Montanus he
told him to take back a milder answer and dismissed him. On his return
Montanus pretended that his errand had been fruitless, and said
nothing about the rest of the interview: but it soon came to light.
Retaining a portion of his force, Civilis sent the veteran cohorts 33
with the most efficient of the German troops against Vocula and his
army. [320] He gave the command to Julius Maximus and his nephew
Claudius Victor. After rushing the winter-quarters of a cavalry
regiment at Asciburgium[321] on their way, they fell upon the Roman
camp and so completely surprised it that Vocula had no time to address
his army or to form it for battle. The only precaution he could take
in the general panic was to mass the legionaries in the centre with
the auxiliaries scattered on either flank. Our cavalry charged, but
found the enemy in good order ready to receive them, and came flying
back on to their own infantry. What followed was more of a massacre
than a battle. The Nervian cohorts, either from panic or treachery,
left our flanks exposed; thus the legions had to bear the brunt. They
had already lost their standards and were being cut down in the
trenches, when a fresh reinforcement suddenly changed the fortune of
the fight. Some Basque auxiliaries,[322] originally levied by Galba,
who had now been summoned to the rescue, on nearing the camp heard the
sound of fighting, and while the enemy were occupied, came charging in
on their rear. This caused more consternation than their numbers
warranted, the enemy taking them for the whole Roman force, either
from Novaesium or from Mainz. This mistake encouraged the Roman
troops: their confidence in others brought confidence in themselves.
The best of the Batavians, at least of their infantry, fell. The
cavalry made off with the standards and prisoners taken in the earlier
stage of the battle. Though our losses that day were numerically
larger, they were unimportant, whereas the Germans lost their best
troops.
On both sides the generals deserved defeat, and failed to make 34
good use of their success. Their fault was the same.
were variously affected by the news. The Gallic auxiliaries, who had
no feelings of affection or dislike to either party and served without
sentiment, promptly took the advice of their officers and deserted
Vitellius. The veterans hesitated; under pressure from Flaccus and
their officers they eventually took the oath of allegiance, but it was
clear from their faces that their hearts were not in it, and while
repeating the rest of the formula they boggled at the name of
Vespasian, either muttering it under their breath or more often
omitting it altogether. Their suspicions were further inflamed 32
when Antonius' letter to Civilis was read out before the meeting; it
seemed to address Civilis as a member of the Flavian party, and to
argue hostility to the German army. The news was next brought to the
camp at Gelduba, where it gave rise to the same comments and the same
scenes. Montanus was sent to carry instructions to Civilis that he was
to cease from hostilities and not to make war on Rome under a false
pretext; if it was to help Vespasian that he had taken arms, he had
now achieved his object. Civilis at first replied in guarded terms.
Then, as he saw that Montanus was an impetuous person who would
welcome a revolution, he began to complain of all the dangers he had
endured in the service of Rome for the last twenty-five years. 'A fine
reward I have received,' he cried, 'for all my labours--my brother's
execution,[319] my own imprisonment,[319] and the bloodthirsty
clamours of this army, from which I claim satisfaction by natural
right since they have sought my destruction. As for you Trevirans and
all the rest that have the souls of slaves, what reward do you hope
to gain for shedding your blood so often in the cause of Rome, except
the thankless task of military service, endless taxation, and the rods
and axes of these capricious tyrants? Look at me! I have only a single
cohort under my command, and yet with the Canninefates and Batavi, a
mere fraction of the Gallic peoples, I am engaged in destroying their
great useless camp and besieging them with famine and the sword. In
short, our venture will either end in freedom or, if we are beaten, we
shall be no worse off than before. ' Having thus inflamed Montanus he
told him to take back a milder answer and dismissed him. On his return
Montanus pretended that his errand had been fruitless, and said
nothing about the rest of the interview: but it soon came to light.
Retaining a portion of his force, Civilis sent the veteran cohorts 33
with the most efficient of the German troops against Vocula and his
army. [320] He gave the command to Julius Maximus and his nephew
Claudius Victor. After rushing the winter-quarters of a cavalry
regiment at Asciburgium[321] on their way, they fell upon the Roman
camp and so completely surprised it that Vocula had no time to address
his army or to form it for battle. The only precaution he could take
in the general panic was to mass the legionaries in the centre with
the auxiliaries scattered on either flank. Our cavalry charged, but
found the enemy in good order ready to receive them, and came flying
back on to their own infantry. What followed was more of a massacre
than a battle. The Nervian cohorts, either from panic or treachery,
left our flanks exposed; thus the legions had to bear the brunt. They
had already lost their standards and were being cut down in the
trenches, when a fresh reinforcement suddenly changed the fortune of
the fight. Some Basque auxiliaries,[322] originally levied by Galba,
who had now been summoned to the rescue, on nearing the camp heard the
sound of fighting, and while the enemy were occupied, came charging in
on their rear. This caused more consternation than their numbers
warranted, the enemy taking them for the whole Roman force, either
from Novaesium or from Mainz. This mistake encouraged the Roman
troops: their confidence in others brought confidence in themselves.
The best of the Batavians, at least of their infantry, fell. The
cavalry made off with the standards and prisoners taken in the earlier
stage of the battle. Though our losses that day were numerically
larger, they were unimportant, whereas the Germans lost their best
troops.
On both sides the generals deserved defeat, and failed to make 34
good use of their success. Their fault was the same.
